University of Minnesota
Software Engineering Center
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Critical Systems Research Group

The Critical Systems Research Group’s (CriSys) research interests are in the general area of software engineering; in particular, software development for critical software applications — applications where incorrect operation of the software could lead to loss of life, substantial material or environmental damage, or large monetary losses. The long-term goal of our research activities is the development of a comprehensive framework for the development of software for critical software systems. Our work has focused on some of the most difficult and least understood aspects of software development—requirements specification and validation/verification.

Recent Publications

Towards Synthesis from Assume-Guarantee Contracts involving Infinite Theories: A Preliminary Report

In previous work, we have introduced a contract-based {\em realizability checking} algorithm for assume-guarantee contracts involving infinite theories, such as linear integer/real arithmetic and uninterpreted functions over infinite domains. This algorithm can determine whether or not it is possible to construct a realization (i.e. an implementation) of an assume-guarantee contract. The algorithm is similar to k-induction model checking, but involves the use of quantifiers to determine implementability.

Reasoning about Algebraic Datatypes with Abstractions

Reasoning about functions that operate over algebraic data types is an important problem for a large variety of applications. One application of particular interest is network applications that manipulate or reason about complex message structures, such as XML messages. This paper presents a decision procedure for reasoning about algebraic data types using abstractions that are provided by catamorphisms: fold functions that map instances of algebraic data types to values in a decidable domain.

Resolute: An Assurance Case Language for Architecture Models

Arguments about the safety, security, and correctness of a complex system are often made in the form of an assurance case. An assurance case is a structured argument, often represented with a graphical interface, that presents and supports claims about a system's behavior. The argument may combine different kinds of evidence to justify its top level claim. While assurance cases deliver some level of guarantee of a system's correctness, they lack the rigor that proofs from formal methods typically provide.

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